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ABSTRACT 
ASHLEY LUBENKOV:  The Dynamic Trans-Atlantic Partnership  
at the Beginning of the Obama Administration 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
This paper analyzes Robert Kagan’s theory that discord is a continual part of the 
trans-Atlantic relationship given that the United States, as the dominant power, is 
willing to exert force in the world and that Europeans, with smaller militaries and 
a concentrated focus on peace, will be reluctant to exert influence. The aftermath 
of the George W. Bush administration and the beginning of the Obama 
Presidency provide an opportunity to assess the trans-Atlantic relationship at the 
conclusion of a decade filled with many points of discord.  To test Kagan’s 
hypothesis, this paper will analyze the American, U.K., and French media of 
varying ideologies, covering the first European trip of President Obama to 
Europe. These sources are analyzed for signs of convergence or divergence on  
US-European relations.  While national differences are not negligible, it would 
appear that partisan ideologyhas the greatest impact on perceptions of the trans-
Atlantic relationship. 
 
 
 
iii 
  
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade marked many changes in international dynamics.  While Asian 
countries advanced in more ways than one, the modern trans-Atlantic relationship was 
put to the test.  A showdown in a 2003 U.N. Security Council meeting regarding the Iraq 
conflict led the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, to confront the United 
States and expose France’s lack of support for the American operation with the phrase, 
“Messieurs, vous n’avez pas de majorité” (Sirs, you do not have the majority).  Thus, the 
United States was forced to face the fact that many of its closest allies, such as France 
and Germany, were unwilling to aid or even endorse the combat mission in Iraq launched 
by the Bush administration.  The chill in the relationships between the countries that 
developed even extended to the U.S. Congress relabeling a familiar food item on its 
cafeteria menu “freedom fries” in lieu of French fries.  While the United States gave the 
cold shoulder to its oldest ally and ties drifted to what seemed like a historical low 
(Canteloube and Vernet 2004), the Bush administration was still cherishing the warm 
relationship it held with the United Kingdom as Prime Minister Tony Blair and Downing 
Street pledged troops and resources to aid the U.S. in the war in Iraq (Coates and Krieger 
2005). 
   It was in the prelude to this drama that Robert Kagan published his 
neoconservative analysis of the trans-Atlantic relationship in 2002, writing that 
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.  Europeans, he argued, were 
still recovering from their previous war-torn centuries and wanted to build their societies 
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without the turmoil that had consumed them in previous generations.  On the other hand, 
Americans were willing to exercise their unchecked power and had no problem taking on 
a solo warrior role.  In the same fashion, Europeans on the continent were more than 
happy to insulate their economies from what they saw as a more savage form of 
capitalism by creating welfare states complete with economic regulation.  It was the 
Americans and British who were content with their laissez-faire model of capitalism that 
was relatively free of government.  
The fallout from the Atlantic alliance and Kagan’s path-changing assertion led 
many political scientists to assess the strength and efficacy of the trans-Atlantic 
relationship.  One diagnosis held that it was the lack of diplomacy that created the rift 
along with a lack of vision and plan for the trans-Atlantic relationship (Asmus 2003).   
Other noted political scientists such as Peter Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane went on 
to study various forms of anti-Americanism in the world.  According to one such study, a 
long history of elite anti-Americanism flourished in France where there was an 
established history of looking down upon American culture (Katzenstein and Keohane 
2007).  Such sentiments call to mind European stereotypes of Americans as cowboys.  
While admitting an ebb and flow for pro-multilateralism among American Presidents, 
another scholar found that the European nations, such as France, also played the 
multilateral card to benefit their foreign policy goals.  For example, by forcing the Iraq 
issue into the U.N. Security Council, France was able to take a stand on the world stage 
and have an important political decision decided in a body where it always had 
permanent veto power (Peterson and Pollack).  Some believed, such as Robert Kagan, 
that the strong trans-Atlantic relationship was a relic of the past and that the United States 
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and Europe would be pursuing different agendas in the future based upon their history 
and place in the world.  On the other hand, analysis by Brian Rathbun (2005) attributed 
the discord to a conflict of ideology and political parties as opposed to national and 
continental interests. 
 In assessing Kagan’s theory, Rathbun notes that ideologues in national arenas 
advocate for national interests in wildly different ways.  He finds Kagan’s analysis is 
flawed in that it does not give enough credence to party ideology.  Writing in 2005, 
Rathbun declared that “transatlantic convergence depends on domestic convergence as 
well. The combination also largely determines whether more or less of an US presence in 
Europe and beyond is desirable to Europeans.  Current tensions are due to the 
combination of a Republican administration in the USA on the one hand and a Gaullist 
government in France and a Red-Green coalition in Germany on the other” (Rathbun 
2005: 53-54).  For Rathbun, the conflict in the Balkans and the debate within the 
countries involved in the conflict served as an example to show that the left and right 
assess issues much differently.  Ultimately, he found that leftist parties were more 
“inclusive and antimilitaristic” than parties of the right wing and ended up being both 
more “humanitarian and multilateralist.”  For example, leftist parties are willing to fight 
wars on humanitarian grounds with more passion than their colleagues on the other side 
of the political spectrum if they can justify the conflict.  While Robert Kagan found the 
fact that even the left-wing of the U.S. supported bombing Milosevic to be evidence of 
the fact that Americans were from Mars, Rathbun found it to demonstrate the different 
analysis that the left uses to go to war in the first place.  Support for conflicts among 
parties of the right-wing does not typically involve welfare.   
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The purpose of this paper is to further assess the validity of Robert Kagan’s 
analysis of the trans-Atlantic relationship and his 2002 assertion that Europe and the 
United States policies came from different places.  The trans-Atlantic relationship played 
an integral role in twentieth-century policy, but it remains to be seen what relationships 
will define foreign policy in the twenty-first century.  Nevertheless, the relationship 
between the U.S. and European actors will remain significant and could be a potential 
base on which to construct goals and tactics.  Ultimately, if Kagan is correct and 
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus, then it should not matter who 
is in charge of Europe or America.  If Mars and Venus are, however, from different 
parties rather than from different countries, then it does seem to make a difference who is 
in charge in Europe and America.  If the former is true, then the transfer of power to the 
Obama administration should not have made a difference; if the latter is true, that transfer 
should make a difference.  In answering this question, this paper will first lay out the 
major points of Kagan’s theory.  To put the hypothesis to the test, the favorability rating 
of the United States and the American Presidency by European countries will also be 
assessed.  To assess the varying ideology within the countries and the convergences and 
divergences in the trans-Atlantic relationship, media of France, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States and its coverage of a trans-Atlantic event, U.S. President Obama’s first 
trip to Europe for the G20 and NATO summits will be analyzed.   
 
Kagan’s contention:  militaristic Americans and peacenik Europeans 
Robert Kagan’s critique of U.S. and European power on the world stage was bold and 
advocated a new direction for U.S. foreign policy.   
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“It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the 
world, or even that they occupy the same world.  On the all-imporant question of power—
the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power—American and 
European perspectives are diverging.  Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a 
little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules 
and transnational negotiation and cooperation.  It is entering a post-historical paradise of 
peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s ‘perpetual peace.’  
Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic 
Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security 
and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of 
military might.  That is why on major strategic and international questions today, 
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus:  They agree on little and 
understand one another less and less.  And this state of affairs is not transitory—the product 
of one American election or one catastrophic event.  The reasons for the transatlantic divide 
are deep, long in development, and likely to endure.  When it comes to setting national 
priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing 
foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways” (Kagan 
2002).   
Kagan’s somber assessment of the American-European foreign policy dynamic is 
sweeping and does not dismiss accounts of discord as mere blips in an overall smooth 
relationship.  He argues, instead, that the Mars and Venus caricatures were created by 
history, with Europe experiencing war fatigue from the twentieth century and the United 
States poised to assert itself on the world stage.  In addition, he believes that Americans 
have more power and think they can use it to get their desired results.  Europeans, on the 
other hand, do not have the same high level of confidence to push for an international 
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outcome with hard power.  He also contends that being the one with the greatest amount 
of power puts a target on the back of the United States because it has the role of the 
enforcer.  In turn, this role can lead the U.S. to be feared and demonized.  On a more 
cheerful note, he also remarks that the plans and goals of the United States and many 
European nations created the current continent that contains hegemony.  In an ironic 
twist, it was the hegemonic interests that created World War I and World War II that 
incited a backlash to retrain Germany and other national interests in overtaking the 
continent.  In the grand scheme of things, Americans should be happy with post-World 
War II Europe as the current state of peace was the ultimate vision that Americans 
initially charted for the continent after the conclusion of the war.  At the same time, the 
varying degrees of power on the continents do not preclude Europe and the United States 
from having common norms and values.   
Kagan also asserted that Europe was inherently multilateral in foreign policy 
while the United States was uniquely unilateral.  This was a result of Americans having 
more military might in what Kagan saw as a contrast to Europe: 
“[Europeans] are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to 
unilateralism is also self-interested.  Europeans fear American 
unilateralism.  They fear it perpetuates a Hobbesian world in which they 
may become increasingly vulnerable.  The United States may be a 
relatively benign hegemon, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a 
world order more conducive to the safety of weaker power, it is 
objectively dangerous” (Kagan 2002).   
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The unilateralism that Kagan asserts also leads the United States to be less 
inclined to work with international institutions or act with other countries to 
achieve an objective.  In further realization of what Kagan calls a Kantian 
perpetual peace, “[Europeans] generally favor peaceful responses to problems, 
preferring negotiation, diplomacy, and persuasion to coercion.  They are quicker 
to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion 
to adjudicate disputes.  They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind 
nations together.  They often emphasize process over result, believing that 
ultimately process can become substance.”  Americans, according to Kagan, are 
none of these things. 
  Absent from Kagan’s theories is significant recognition of the differences 
within political parties and philosophies.  He does note, however, that his analysis 
serves as more of a caricature.  In addition, he claims that some Americans may 
be more “European” and some Europeans more “American.”  Colin Powell, for 
example, may not have the same foreign policy outlook as Donald Rumsfeld.  
Nevertheless, he feels that most Americans have more in common than they 
would with another European. 
 Although Robert Kagan did not dwell upon the “commercial and economic ties” 
in his “Power and Weakness” analysis, they do agree in with his analysis, and he did 
comment on economic policies in relationship to Europe at a later date.  In a column he 
wrote on April 2, 2009 for the Washington Post that was intended to coincide with 
Obama’s first trip to Europe for the G20 and NATO summits, Kagan updated his theory 
and included commentary on the divergences of economic policy.  As was the case with 
 8 
military and security, European economic policy came from a history of turmoil.  In his 
article, Kagan highlighted “the rampant inflations and depressions of the 1920s and 
1930s.”  To highlight the conflict with an American response to economic recession, 
Keynesian economics, Kagan wrote, “The E.U.'s economic strictures, which now act as a 
barrier to Keynesian deficit spending, were put there by the Germans, for whom 
memories of inflation, not depression, are the great nightmare. The Germans and French 
prefer welfare payments to government stimulus spending, for they are part of the passive 
system of social safety nets on which their citizens have grown so comfortably 
dependent. The creative destruction of the business-oriented political economies of the 
Anglo-Americans is too violent and unstable, too brutal and unpredictable. Better to 
regulate more tightly the international capitalists who can cause havoc through their 
inventiveness. Better to be less rich than less secure” (Kagan 2009).  In Kagan’s neo-
conservative world view, Europeans and Americans are in a different place economically 
and militarily.  The Americans are ready for risk and ready to use their strength.  
Europeans, on the other hand, are more than reluctant to take the same path that led them 
to so much trouble in the past. 
 
Method: Polling “Venus” about “Mars” 
To analyze the conclusion that Americans and Europeans are worlds apart, one 
could take a look at opinion polls to find the favorability of one country among others.  
For example, one can compare the approval that Europeans had of the United States 
under the Republican Presidency of George W. Bush and the Democratic Presidency of 
Barack Obama.   While it is not the function of this study to predict whether Barack 
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Obama will be able to resurrect a strong and mutually beneficial relationship with Europe 
while in the White House, public opinion polls do tell a great deal and at least show an 
initial desire to renew the friendship.  As opinion polls and events seemed to demonstrate, 
the polarizing years of the Bush administration may not have been the best time to put 
this theory to a test given the polarizing nature of George W. Bush himself on the 
international stage.  At the end of the Bush Presidency, it became clear that Kagan 
himself was at least wrong in one area of his theory.  The United States was not able to be 
as unilateral as the neoconservatives such as Kagan had initially hoped.  The 
unilateralism could even have been the Achilles heel of the administration as it 
overstretched the United States military and ultimately forced George W. Bush to go 
back to his Venusian allies and continue to seek commitments for more troops in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  The failure of America’s unilateralism pushed American 
Presidential candidates in 2008 to promise some form of multilateralism. The current 
crises affect both Europe and the United States, with a globalized economy touching 
everyone and many European nations having had their own experiences with the 
previously Afghanistan-based terrorist group al Qaeda. 
Kagan’s theory seemed to reflect the feelings and events of the time as many 
Europeans on the continent were reluctant about sending troops to the NATO-led mission 
in Afghanistan and completely against playing any role with the operation in Iraq.  After 
the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq, public opinion of the U.S. on behalf of Europeans also 
dropped significantly.  The favorability of the United States among French citizens was 
62, 42, and 37 percent in 2002, 2003, and 2004, ultimately showing a large drop after the 
American drive to invade Iraq.  The same sentiments during the matching time period for 
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another large group of continental Europeans, the Germans, were 60, 45, and 38 percent.  
For the British, however, the opinion did drop, but not to the same extreme, measuring at 
82, 80, and 72 percent favorability of the United States (Pew Global Attitudes Project 
2010).   
Conversely, the countries’ public opinion levels did jump much higher at another 
point in time, after the election of U.S. President Barack Obama.  In 2007, 2008, and 
2009, public favorability of the United States from the perspective of the French and 
German people was 42, 75, and 73 percent and then 31, 64 and 63 percent respectively.  
The opinion rating of the United States stayed relatively the same for the British with 
opinion fluctuating from 70, 73, and 73 percent in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (Pew).  The 
opinion of British citizens ultimately did not vary to the degree of that of the Europeans 
on the continent.  The fluctuation of French opinion of the United States, however, is 
nothing new in itself for the trans-Atlantic relationship.  The relationship has generally 
had its strong and weak points like many friendships, but the swings have been frequent 
and can even be extreme.  French President de Gaulle had his significant points of 
contention with the United States leading up to France’s withdrawal from NATO in 1966, 
long after de Gaulle had initially proposed a US-UK-France ‘directorate’ for the Alliance 
in September 1958.  Successive French and American Presidents encountered similar 
cycles when their ties would be tested by events such as war in the Middle East or 
France’s desire to chart a different course outside of NATO.  The Presidents have always 
seemed to enter their own respective offices hopeful of renewing the old friendship (Bozo 
and Parmentier 2007). 
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 The election of Barack Obama helped take away some of the negative stigma that 
the United States and the American Presidency seemed to take in the previous decade that 
went beyond the traditional ebb and flow cycle.  After all, the French had approval 
ratings of the respective American Presidents in 2008, 2009, and 2010 of 13, 91, and 87 
percent.  During the same years, the Germans had opinion ratings of 14, 93 and 90 
percent while even the British had opinions of 16, 86, and 84 percent.  In 2003, the first 
year that this question was asked, the French had a 20 percent approval rating of George 
W. Bush, the Germans a 33 percent rating and the British a 51 percent rating  (Pew).  
Obama’s popularity also serves the function of depriving European leaders the 
convenient excuse of blaming policies or lack of an accord on an unpopular American 
President.  With Obama’s popularity abroad, European leaders will have to make an 
earnest attempt at negotiations.  The rising Obama fever, as it has been called in the 
United States, could also lead to disappointment on behalf of the Europeans in the United 
States and its lack of ability to deliver the change that the Obama campaign had 
emphasized.  Ultimately, many issues that will need to be addressed for Europeans after 
eight years of the Bush administration and the need for a change may run aspirations so 
high that they can never be fulfilled (Schake 2007).  
 
Study: Ideologies across the newspapers of France, the U.K., and the U.S. 
 A second way in which one could gauge the veracity of Kagan’s views is through 
content analysis of media reporting on particular US-EU events.  If Europeans and 
Americans are that far apart, the tension exhibited at summits will come through in the 
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media.  In addition, the events would be news-worthy and will be covered by media on 
both sides of the Atlantic.   
The current moment in history does present one such clear moment to analyze the 
distance between Europe and the United States.  France returned to the full NATO 
structure in 2009 forty-three years after its initial withdrawal, sixty years after the Cold 
War structure was created, and twenty years after the beginning of the end of the Cold 
War.  The conflict in Europe’s backyard in the Balkans is also largely over as is much of 
the initial fallout over the Iraq war and the September 11 attack (Vaisse 2009).  With 
great global challenges instead of neighborhood projects being the focus of the trans-
Atlantic relationship on terrorism and the financial crisis, the convergences and 
divergences on policy should be clear as each policy issue will have to be negotiated 
(Howorth and Keeler 2003).   
One such significant event was President Obama’s first European tour as 
President of the United States in April of 2009 (within the timeframe of the first one 
hundred days in office that U.S. administrations use to symbolically set the tone for the 
rest of the administration), President Barack Obama garnered much media coverage as he 
visited London for the round of G20 negotiations, Strasbourg, France and Baden Baden, 
Germany to commemorate the 60th anniversary of NATO, Prague to visit the country of 
the European President at the time, and Turkey.  These events provide an opportunity for 
different governments to present their policy goals in a public forum and negotiate.  They 
also provide material to analyze where the countries stand on issues.  Instead of focusing 
on the politics of all European NATO, EU, or G20 members, there will be a focus on 
France and the UK as Obama visited both countries on economic and security issues.  In 
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addition, France also seems to advocate for the same agenda as Germany in international 
circles.  As a large European country, France is also comfortable with taking the role of 
representing the Europe.  While the UK is also one of the larger European nations, it is 
known to be reluctant to completely embrace the points of view of the continent and 
often demonstrates a viewpoint similar to that of the United States (Parmentier 2002-
2003), which is why some say that the English Channel is wider than the Atlantic Ocean. 
Britain’s unique position with one foot in Europe and one in step with the United States 
also provides a good vantage point to analyze the relationship.   
In this study, newspaper articles regarding Obama’s visits to the events will be 
analyzed to see if they fit with Robert Kagan’s theory that Americans are the warriors 
from Mars and Europeans the Venusians.  For ideological balance, a mix of different 
media from the three countries are used in this study:  four British newspapers (The 
Guardian – left of center, Daily Telegraph – conservative, The Times – right of center, 
and The Financial Times, a business newspaper) and the three French newspapers of the 
left, the right and the center (Le Monde – slightly left of center, Liberation – left, Le 
Figaro – right and more business-focused) will be analyzed for their coverage; the New 
York Times (slightly left), Washington Post (moderate), USA Today (center), and the Wall 
Street Journal (right of center and business-focused) will constitute the American 
papers. Analysis and editorial copy that leaves an assessment regarding the meeting will 
be taken into account for showing divergences or convergences in trans-Atlantic financial 
policy.  A piece that shows a convergence and then a divergence within the same article 
will be considered neutral while event summaries will be disregarded from analysis 
altogether.  After all, newspapers are not only a semi-public forum for debate with the 
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elite giving their opinions, but also a source of information that readers can choose from.  
Media can also reinforce attitudes and serve as a relevant marketplace of ideas for healthy 
societies.  The United Kingdom is known for having several strong newspapers of 
different backgrounds based in London.  Like the U.K., France’s national newspapers are 
based in its capitol and have varying ideologies.  The United States, on the other hand, 
has several regional newspapers, but the papers considered to be national papers are the 
four American papers that make up this study.   Given that the events took place at the 
beginning of April, the search was conducted during the one-week time frame at the 
beginning of the month following Obama’s arrival and after his initial meetings with 
other world leaders.  For the first week of the month in April, the media is especially on 
Obama’s first overseas trips and meetings. 
ANALYSIS 
 During his European trip, President Obama visited a triumvirate of European 
powers:  the United Kingdom in London, France by way of Strasbourg, and Germany by 
visiting Baden Baden.  The events in London revolved around the G20 summit.  Thus, 
they provide an opportunity to assess economic convergences between Europe and the 
United States.  The events in Strasbourg and Baden-Baden merged as they were nearby 
on the French-German border and dealt with security and NATO issues.  These two 
major events will be the source of media coverage by French, British, and American 
newspapers to analyze.   
a) THE G20 MEETING 
At the G20 meeting in London, President Obama met with several international 
leaders including China’s Premier and Russia’s President.  The major negotiations that 
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took place between several parties focused on several issues among which financial 
regulation and stimulus money were priorities.  As might be expected, France and 
Germany as well as other continental European countries represented in the larger G20 
group wanted an agreement to move towards more financial regulation.  The United 
States is generally more hesitant regarding financial regulation, especially regarding 
international rules. The free market that dominates the American economy and its 
supporters of laissez-faire economics have often been at odds with any type of financial 
regulation.  The United States economy is typically the most “liberal” economy in the 
world according to most economists.  The United Kingdom also typically tries to avoid 
financial regulation of its large banking sector.  As many noted, this was a major point of 
contention in the meetings that the newspapers did touch upon.  According to the 
groundbreaking book The Three World of Capitalism by Gosta Esping-Andersen that 
analyzes the various forms of capitalism, France represents a typical “corporatist” 
economy while the U.S. economy possesses a great degree of economic “liberalism”.  
The U.S. economy is built upon having a laissez-faire economic system, which 
contributes to large boom and bust cycles.  The French economy is based around a 
heavily regulated economy centered on a traditional family.  The United Kingdom’s 
economy tends to follow the model of the American economy while the German 
economy is like that of France.  Naturally, this can lead to some sort of friction and show 
some friction at an international summit focused on dealing with a major global financial 
crisis. 
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France and the G-20:  concern with regulation 
Overall, the French media showed some points of contention in what happened 
during the negotiations regarding regulation.  The three French newspapers had seven 
pieces focused on Obama’s work at the meetings at the beginning of April.  Five articles 
highlighted the fact that the United States was not on the same page as France, whereas 
the two positive pieces regarding France and the economy had more to do with an 
appreciation for how Obama handles himself in meetings and a willingness to give him 
“a chance” in regards to the meeting.  On April 2, Le Figaro, the right-leaning business-
centered French newspaper highlighted the fact  that France and the United States were 
not on the same team in two articles, as opposed to Germany, which was clearly on the 
same side.  The editorial that Le Figaro featured on the same day praised Obama’s 
diplomatic skills, but recognized that that would not be enough.  The more centrist Le 
Monde also highlighted a similar theme in one article that the United States system is 
approaching the economic problem from a different place altogether.  The other article 
developed the typical French motif that France needed to show a united Europe and push 
the European economic agenda at the event, especially given the fact that the Czech 
Presidency of the European Union in spring 2009 was especially weak.  Like Le Figaro, 
Le Monde focused on the differences between the United States and Europe in its pieces.  
It was the more left-leaning Liberation that offered an editorial written by Francois 
Sergent entitled “Give Obama a Chance.”  The editorial argued that France needed to 
give the U.S. some prospects.  The positive piece was centered on his celebrity and also 
lauded the devotion he had given in order to turn around the economy within the United 
States.  The piece that showed the trans-Atlantic divergence amongst the left-leaning 
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Liberation was directly showing a contrast between American and French priorities.  The 
United States wanted to keep the economy going, while France was more interested in 
regulation.  
Figure 1.1 
G20 France France overall Liberation Le Monde Figaro 
+  convergence 2 2 0 0 
_  divergence 5 1 2 2 
= neutral 0 0 0 0 
 
G20 and the UK:  convergence on the left, divergence on the right   
 
The London media was able to comb its own city for stories about the G20 in the 
financial capitol.  Ultimately, however, its papers did not show the same level of 
divergences between Europe and the other side of the Atlantic as the French media.  
Seven stories at the beginning of April highlighted commonalities, seven stories 
showcased the differences and two stories were generally equivocal about the 
negotiations themselves.  Several articles allied the United Kingdom with the United 
States in regards to their respective financial systems.  Others, on the other hand, showed 
a distance from France and Germany.  The conservative Daily Telegraph highlighted the 
greatest amount of discord with all five of its stories from April 1 to April 3, 2009 and 
focused on the divergences on economic policy on both sides of the Atlantic.  The 
common motif was the idea that the United States and the United Kingdom were on the 
same team working against France and Germany.  An April 2 editorial by Ian Martin 
underscored the importance of the free market.  The left-of-center Guardian, on the other 
hand, focused on the positive sides of the negotiations and the common ground that was 
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achieved in all three of its articles.  Its April 3 piece claimed that the meeting had good 
results.  A light article that ran on April 1 was positive regarding the American diplomacy 
at the meeting.  The April 1 article noted that the two sides of the Atlantic really were not 
that far apart after all.  First, the piece mentioned the bizarre dynamic of having left-of-
center governments in the United States and the United Kingdom for an economic policy 
meeting while many of the continental European governments were far more 
conservative.  Although the right-wing governments may not be embracing Keynesian 
economics and spending to prime the pump of the economy as Barack Obama was 
advocating, they were doing their own sort of emergency spending in the end as they 
were spending much more than their liberal economy counterparts as a result of the safety 
net within their own welfare systems.  Like the Guardian, the slightly right of center 
Times also emphasized commonality.  In their April 1 article, the newspaper noticed that 
it was the United States that was in fact moving closer to a European position on 
regulation.  The two April 2 pieces were not as focused on bridging a trans-Atlantic 
divide as they were about focusing on pure ideology.  One article claimed that it was 
center-left governments that were responsible in financial crises and not those of the 
center right because center-left governments ultimately turned to Keynesianism.  The 
other April 2 article highlighted the fact that Brown and Barack were a natural team when 
it came to navigating the summit because Democrats are, after all, similar to the Labour 
Party when it comes to ideology.  Thus, the differences did not have as much to do with 
the countries at hand as it did with an international political spectrum.  The Financial 
Times, like other conservative papers, was willing to highlight some trans-Atlantic 
divergences on the economy.  Two articles highlighted convergences and divergences in 
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policy (ultimately neutral), while two showed differences, and one showed the common 
ground forged by diplomacy.  Two articles that came out on April 2 did note the gap in 
financial policy between the Anglo-Saxons and the continental Europeans, but they also 
mentioned the positive developments and common ground forged by Obama’s 
diplomacy.  An April 1 article mentioned the friction at the conference.  One April 3 
article highlighted the positives of diplomacy at the meeting.  The other April 3 piece, 
however, mentioned French President Sarkozy’s victory claim regarding the summit 
while contrasting his statement with a call from France’s Socialist Party leader Martine 
Aubry for more stimulus funding in France like Obama did for the U.S.   
Figure 1.2 
G20 UK UK overall Guardian Times Financial 
Times 
Daily 
Telegraph 
+convergence 7 3 1 1 0 
-divergence 7 0 0 2 5 
=neutral 2 0 2 2 0 
 
 
G-20 seen by the United States:  good results 
 
 The print media of the United States was ultimately more positive regarding the 
G20 summit than the media of France or the U.K.  Two articles were neutral regarding 
potential trans-Atlantic differences, nine seemed to show common ground, and one 
showed differences.  The New York Times showed a portrayal of more convergences in 
policy with three articles showing common ground and the other two being somewhat 
neutral after pointing out both consensus, but also divisions across the Atlantic in articles 
published on April 2 and April 5.  The New York Times gave a good review of the summit 
on April 3 and on April 1 claimed that it was the U.S. that was moving towards European 
regulation (while avoiding pressure on Germany to add more stimulus).  Despite the 
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seeming lack of Keynesian economists at the summit on the continental Europe side, the 
The New York Times noted that stimulus is happening in Europe in other ways, notably 
through welfare spending.  As such, the U.S. and Europe really were not that far apart.  
The centered (although sometime right-leaning) USA Today included one article on April 
3 that left a generally positive assessment of the summit with a note on managing 
expectations.  The moderate Washington Post offered three positive articles on the 
summit including a modest appraisal that the G20 summit was fine in an April 3 editorial.  
An April 2 editorial by David Ignatius indicated that Europe should be receptive and 
Obama should himself move closer to Europe and regulation.  A financial column also 
indicated that financial transatlantic tension was improving after the summit, certainly a 
rosy picture.  The sole portrayal that included a negative divide was an editorial by 
Harold Myerson published on April 1 that indicated that there was still a continental 
divide when it came to regulation.   Aside from generic summaries, the Wall Street 
Journal offered one positive piece on April 2 that claimed that Germany and France and 
Obama’s America were really not that far apart on foreign policy.   
Figure 1.3 
US G20 US overall NYT Post USA Today WSJ 
+convergence 9 3 3 1 1 
-divergence 1 0 1 0 0 
=neutral 2 2 0 0 0 
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G20 Analysis 
When it came to the G20, the American media seemed far more apt to point out 
convergences in policy with Europe than its European counterparts.  The U.K. media 
found a mixed bag of convergences and divergences in policy, while the French media 
overall found plenty to set itself apart from Anglo-Saxon economies.  The difference 
within the countries was that the papers on the left of the political spectrum seemed more 
ready to point out the common ground in financial policy on both sides of the Atlantic 
instead of focusing on the divisions.  
Naturally, there were some points of contention, which is why the leaders meet in 
the first place.  The differences cannot be blown out of proportion nor can they be swept 
under the rug.  They do not seem to create, however, a depiction of two groups that 
inhabit Venus and Mars.  Poll numbers of the populations, according to 2009 
Transatlantic Trends, do show a difference in opinion amongst nationalities in regard to 
the free market.  81% of Americans and 69% of E.U. citizens felt that a free market 
economy was best for people.  In terms of loyalty to a free market system, 54% of 
Americans strongly agreed with a free market leaving people better off compared to 37% 
of the British and 20% of the French. 
The issue of regulation seemed to dominate the news much more than Keynesian 
economics even though John Millard Keynes himself was English.  It seemed that in the 
end the Obama administration decided not to push too hard on the stimulus issue, which 
is perhaps one reason why it did not make the papers in the end.  The other reason may be 
that continental Europeans felt that their welfare states already matched the emergency 
stimulus programs enacted in the United States.   
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b) Strasbourg, Baden Baden, and NATO 
 After leaving London, Obama headed to the French town of Strasbourg to address 
students at a conference and then to Baden Baden in Germany for a NATO summit and a 
celebration of the Alliance’s 60th anniversary.  The tasks for Obama would be to address 
and win over a crowd of students and then hopefully get more troops for Afghanistan 
from other NATO nations.  Although European nations have contributed significant 
numbers of troops to Afghanistan, there is still a strong amount of reluctance on the part 
of country leaders to commit more troops to the region.  Robert Kagan seemed to have 
argued in 2002 that Europe is reticent to get involved in military conflicts.  Compared to 
other armies around the world, however, the countries of NATO seem to have 
demonstrated willingness for combat.   Given that countries need to have a relatively high 
per capita income before establishing a strong military force as well as advanced 
technology and a history of military spending in the past, European countries are 
uniquely suited allies.  While Robert Kagan’s generalization about Americans being from 
Mars and Europeans may sound dismissive about European might, 21 percent of world 
spending on military is European.   This is significantly higher than the 5 percent of 
China or the 3% of Russia.  Currently, 21 of the 24 allied countries engaged in 
Afghanistan are European (Moravscik 2010).  Nevertheless, Europeans and Americans 
may have different beliefs among citizens as to how involved they should get.   
 
 France, security, and the Atlantic Alliance:   NATO Now?   
 
 After just having just recently rejoined the Atlantic Alliance, the meeting in 
Strasbourg was significant for France.  The decision to rejoin NATO after being absent 
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since 1966 was met with much controversy throughout the country among citizens and 
officials.  In 2009, 63% of French people thought that NATO was necessary.  
Nevertheless, France reestablished itself as a full-fledged member.  The media coverage 
of some of the first official business at the summit was met with several opinions.  
Overall, five significant stories expressed a gap between France and the rest of the 
alliance, four expressed some convergence, and one story was neutral.   Le Monde 
displayed the mixed feelings that France seemed to have towards the NATO policies with 
two positive stories and three negative stories.  The negative news brief that was printed 
on April 5 described a supposed adversarial relationship between European leaders and 
President Obama.  One positive piece of editorial analysis written by Natalie Nougayrede 
on April 3 described a new phase and starting point for the Atlantic alliance.  The 
announcement of the closing of Guantanamo prison by the Obama White House had 
issued in a new era for the link between the continents.  The popularity of Obama and the 
gesture to demonstrate common values had helped to create more soft power for the 
United States.  The other positive story simply of April 5 simply described the charm of 
Obama.  The main two negative stories that were both printed on April 5 claimed that 
Obama had the same message as Bush and that while there was politeness on the surface, 
there were still great divergences.  Liberation continued to show that it accepted a more 
cooperative outlook and that France bought into the collective defense ideology with the 
headline “Ton allie tu defendras” (your ally will defend you) in the April 4 paper by Jean-
Dominique Merchet.  The other article from Liberation on the same day showcased a 
press conference with allies.  Le Figaro, on the other hand, was less enthusiastic.  Its 
article that seemed to be relatively neutral showcased NATO as a rival of a European 
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security agency.  Another article claims that reintegration with NATO was not a good 
decision and that the EDSP (a European security force) would be better.  A minor story 
also referenced that the troop request by Obama was politely refused. For years, 
reintegration with NATO was a dead letter for French governments.  President Chirac 
made an effort, but ultimately failed to get the necessary votes.  The fact that France 
finally did reintegrate, however, seems to show some reluctance and acquiescence to an 
international alliance.  The French may still show trepidation in committing more troops 
for Afghanistan, but the government ultimately made a step towards another alliance.   
Figure 2.1 
NATO FRANCE Liberation Le Monde Figaro 
+convergence 4 2 2 0 
-divergence 5 0 3 2 
=neutral 1 0 0 1 
 
  
The United Kingdom and security:  We’re better than the rest of Europe 
 
The U.K., like the United States, has sent troops to the Middle East for the better 
part of a decade.  The enthusiasm for NATO is also higher in the U.K. According to 
Transatlantic Trends, 72 percent of U.K. citizens believed that there was a need for 
NATO in 2009 compared with a high of 76 percent in 2002.  The United Kingdom has 
often acted in tandem with the United States on affairs regarding the Middle East.  It also 
has had an evolving interest in European security and affairs in the form of the European 
Security Defense Policy that it initiated with the French in 1998, although France had 
been the major driving force of its creation and the continuing work horse (Major and 
Molling 2007).  Its special relationship with the United States and its special position 
within Europe helps give the U.K. the opportunity to evaluate both European and 
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American policies.  On the whole, four pieces in the U.K. media suggested a union 
between continental European policies and Anglo-Saxon approaches.  Eight articles, 
however, suggested deviation. The right-of-center Times advocated an increase of more 
support troops while its other article lamented Europe’s lagging in the Atlantic alliance 
and divisions.  Entitled “Europe: No we can’t”, the article claimed that Obama had failed 
to win the NATO troops he wanted for Afghanistan from other European nations.  In 
Europe, “Gordon Brown was the only one to offer substantial help.  He offered to send 
several hundred extra British soldiers to provide security during the August election but 
even that fell short of the thousands of combat troops that the US was hoping to prise 
from the Prime Minister.”  This stands in contrast to France, the host of the event, which 
offered no troops.  The only other European countries that made commitments in offering 
troops were Belgium and Spain.  Spain would send 12 military trainers and Belgium 35.  
The two articles of The Guardian echoed pessimistic analysis as well.  One article from 
April 4 offered historical analysis with a questioning tone regarding NATO, an alliance 
of different goals.  The other, which was printed on April 3, claimed that Europe had let 
down the United States.   
The Financial Times, like the other newspapers, mentioned the diplomatic style of 
the U.S. President as a positive change.  In two of their articles, however, the positive 
change was the main focus.  With headlines such as “No time lost in building bridges” 
(April 4), the articles suggested an accord.  When it came to further participation in the 
Afghanistan war and a surge in troops, the articles were more critical of Europe. 
Ultimately, this seems to push the U.K. into the same camp as the Americans when it 
comes to the outlook on the war and demonstrate a schism between Europe and the 
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“Anglo-Saxons”.  Three Financial Times articles showed that schism.  The opinion piece 
printed on April 8 penned by Quentin Peel claimed that Europe was wrong in not helping 
more with the war.  In his article “Afghan war: what is wrong with the Europeans?”, Peel 
confronted the white elephant in this debate regarding what role public opinion polls 
were doing to influence the foreign policy decisions of leaders.  “But European 
governments are terrified of offending hostile public opinion that cannot understand—
and has never had it explained—why their soldiers should be dying in such a distant 
land.”  Peel found European countries to be in the wrong on the issue. Three out of the 
four articles in The Daily Telegraph also wrote about the differences in the country.  The 
only so-called convergence in an April 8 piece was Barack Obama’s popularity, not his 
politics.  The other two articles that highlighted the divergences claimed that the U.S. 
came home empty-handed and highlighted that French President Sarkozy was not going 
to increase French troop levels.  The article that did suggest a coming together gave the 
assessment that Barack Obama came to the summit humble and also talked about 
American arrogance of the past.  In effect, it was Obama who was trying to move closer 
to Europe.   
Overall, the comments showed the differences between the Europe and the United 
States and showed a convergence between the attitudes of the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  The critiques of European policies in not being engaged or committed 
enough to the NATO mission in Afghanistan also seemed to add credence to Kagan’s 
notion that Europeans of the continent were reticent to get involved in war.  At the same 
time, one must acknowledge that European countries were already involved in the 
conflict.  Both the United Kingdom and the United States have had major terrorist attacks 
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that originated from al Qaeda’s network. Notably absent from the articles, however, is 
skepticism from the Europeans about the mission in Afghanistan.  The area of contention 
comes with deciding what to support with troop numbers.  It may be harder for other 
European countries to make the case that they should extend their resources to 
Afghanistan.  The three options for the European countries could be to (1) withdraw, (2) 
maintain the status quo, or (3) increase troop levels.  At the summit, it seemed that most 
chose to maintain the status quo and contributions to increase troop levels were modest.  
For newspapers, the status quo may not be newsworthy, but it is still a choice.   
Figure 2.2 
NATO  UK UK overall Guardian Times Financial 
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Telegraph 
+convergence 4 0 1 2 1 
-divergence 8 2 1 3 3 
=neutral 0 0 0 0 0 
 
  
 
United States, international security, and NATO:  Show us the troops 
 
Like the London-based media, American newspapers also revealed the discords of 
the summit.  Barack Obama had talked about Afghanistan during his campaign as a 
critical war and discussed the need to reach out to more allies.  A more multilateral 
approach is something that Robert Kagan would have deemed as being more “European”.  
The multilateral approach seemed to be a part of Barack Obama’s style and rhetoric at 
events.  Nevertheless, the American media was eager to point out the lack of troop 
contributions from European countries at the summit.  In advance of the summit, 
President Obama had pledged 21,000 troops to be part of a surge.  At the summit, he 
asked Europe to do more as part of a speech and warned that not supporting the surge 
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“would leave Europe open to a fresh terrorist offensive”.  Overall, six articles assessed a 
climate of division, two were positive, and 2 were neutral.  The New York Times had a 
piece that was generally neutral regarding the summit on Obama’s speech about how 
Europeans need to meet the United States halfway.  The other modestly-positive piece 
was a positive one on Barack Obama’s style at the event.  The negative article in the 
Times highlighted the lack of troop contributions.  The Washington Post followed a 
similar pattern in having three pieces that each showed positive diplomacy, a sense of 
balance, and also general discord.  A positive analysis of Obama’s speech showed 
diplomacy and a certain sense of convergence internationally.  The overall neutral article 
reflected the confidence and belief in the mission among Europeans while they were also 
reluctant to contribute more troops.  The article that focused on the discord centered on 
the lack of troop contributions from the reluctant Europeans leaders.   
 The coverage in both the Wall Street Journal and the USA Today did not include 
any articles that suggested some level of accord amongst Europeans and the United 
States.  One article of the three articles published April 4 discussed the weak support for 
the mission.  Another did note that Obama did have some popularity abroad, but chose to 
highlight that his popularity was fading.  The strongly-worded opinion piece decried 
Obama’s foreign policy worldwide and general viewpoint, with author Bret Stephens 
having had highlighted what he perceived to be Obama’s numerous missteps.  Following 
the author’s narrative of “Obama’s unreality tour” was the inability to get more NATO 
troops for the mission in Afghanistan.  Stephens, having represented a neoconservative 
viewpoint, also criticized Obama’s wisdom on arms control, which he argued will only 
end up weakening countries that believe in disarmament.  The sole article in the USA 
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Today did not offer such a harsh critique of the current U.S. administration, but did fit the 
news story that Europe was not delivering in the trans-Atlantic relationship.   Curiously, 
the neoconservative author of the Wall Street Journal piece was the only one in U.S. 
media to set itself apart from the Obama administration and question its goals and actions 
in regards to the NATO summit.  His piece, however, still attempted to show a 
divergence between U.S. and European foreign policy in regards to security.   
Figure 2.3 
US NATO US overall NYT Post USA Today WSJ 
+convergence 2 1 1 0 0 
-divergence 6 1 1 1 3 
=neutral 2 1 1 0 0 
 
 
Overall European Trip:  a mixed review 
 The conclusion of Obama’s first trip abroad in Europe as President at the end of 
the week gave the media an opportunity to address the developments of the previous few 
days.  The overall assessment was mixed in France, although it leaned positive while the 
U.K. was slightly negative.  As can be expected, the United States was full of different 
opinions and analyses.   
 Overall, the French media was not critical of President Obama’s new 
administration.  While an April 7 editorial in Le Monde did say that differences will 
persist on issues and that it was impossible for Obama to measure up to the hype, it also 
made clear that there was some progress.  What had changed the most, according to the 
article, was the manner of Obama’s approach.  The sense of working together did count 
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for something.  Liberation’s general critique was that Obama was generally better than 
Bush and a step in the right direction.  The overarching piece that was printed in Le 
Figaro on April 2 during the tour attributed differences between the Obama 
administration and Europe to the new dynamics of having governments of the left in the 
United States and the United Kingdom while having governments of the right in most of 
continental Europe, such as France, Germany, and the Czech Republic during the Czech 
Republic’s term as President of the European Union.   
 The Financial Times was the sole British newspaper to offer two opinion pieces 
about the tour.  One op-ed penned by Gideon Rachman that was published April 7 
criticized the summit and its lack of substance and predicted a doubtful verdict on actual 
results.  On a more positive note, author Jonathan Freedland did suggest a positive 
substantive change for the trans-Atlantic relationship in his article “All around Europe, 
we are getting used to a very different president.” Like the French media, the British 
articles did not critique the new American administration’s policies or tactic in Europe.   
The American media had both praise and optimism for the new trans-Atlantic 
relationship, but was also more critical of the progress that Obama had made.  The USA 
Today on April 6 published a general good review about the summits and gave the 
assessment of a good first step.  The New York Times left it to a German perspective to 
make the case that the new U.S. foreign policy was making the right moves abroad for 
the Europeans.  According to the author Nicholas Kulish, one of the perceived problems 
Obama was facing regarding European reluctance had more to do with German 
stubbornness than anything else.   The Washington Post published two opinion pieces 
that doubted trans-Atlantic agreement.  In an April 5 editorial, the author Jackson Diel 
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suggested that “Obama [was] going along to get along”, which could just show a desire 
for a trans-Atlantic relationship and not any substance.       
The editorial by Robert Kagan published in the Washington Post also on April 2 
seemed to offer an updated version of his critique of trans-Atlantic dynamics.  In 2009, 
Kagan still stood by his analysis of a European Venus and American Mars.  After all, he 
saw divergences on every level including the economic system and the military.  He did 
note that now the EU was conservative.  However, the barrier to Keynesian economics 
and deficit-spending had been put in place by Germany because they have the social 
safety nets and therefore will not respond to Barack Obama’s deficit spending plan.  In 
addition, he noted that Europe’s war fatigue had not waned, meaning that Europeans 
would have been reluctant to become entrenched in Afghanistan and other wars.  In his 
updated column, Kagan instead advocated for the Obama officials to find out if they 
believed that the gap created by Bush will vanish.  He instead prescribed a soft 
unilateralism.  Instead of pressuring Europe in the future, he advocated having low 
expectations for Europe and to continue going on without them.   
 
Conclusion: Europeans and Americans are not necessarily from Venus and Mars 
 
Several years later, Robert Kagan seemed to still feel that his analysis of 
Americans being from Mars and Europeans from Venus still held true.  In the grand 
scheme of things, European and American media still noticed policy differences, but the 
dramatic level of clash between civilizations did not seem to be present as he laid it out in 
his “Power and Weakness:  Why the United States and Europe see the world differently.”  
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more regulation needed to be a part of the financial systems, although both groups 
differed on some level as to the extent.  There were differences regarding how best to 
stimulate an economy.  The continental European government seemed content with a 
small amount of stimulus, and instead, a reliance on their social safety nets.  The leaders 
of the United States and United Kingdom, however, tried to push for a strong global 
stimulus package—an idea that was not strongly embraced in Europe.  The underlying 
difference between the groups, as many of the articles in the media seemed to indicate, 
may have had more to do with political ideology.  This certainly seemed to be the case 
for the newspapers as media outlets on the right side of the political spectrum 
traditionally found more conflicts in policy than the traditionally left-wing papers.  The 
fact was that European governments were currently conservative and Anglo-Saxon 
governments were leaned left in 2009.  John Millard Keynes may have been from 
Europe, but continentals were not embracing his policies as much as the Obama 
administration.  Conservative governments chose instead to rely on conservative 
economic policies.   
In regards to the NATO summit, the governments of the United Kingdom, France, 
and the United States seemed to be on the same page for the first time in about half a 
century.  The differences of the governments had more to do with the war in Afghanistan 
and a potential troop surge.  The U.K. was on board and promised some troops.  France, 
on the other hand, did not promise the troops requested by the Obama administration. 
Although it refused the request, France did not rebuke the policies nor promise a pull-out 
date in the future of its current troops as it could have.  The U.K. and the U.S. media 
pointed out the refusal and noted the difference in approach.  In this respect, Robert 
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Kagan’s contention that continental Europeans are peaceniks with war fatigue would 
certainly have merit.  At the same time, the French press, which had been critical of 
NATO, did not come out against the Afghanistan war.  The French, who were certainly 
not very enthusiastic about the war, could have chosen not to participate.  After all, it 
takes work to defend the status quo and continue to devote resources to an international 
war effort.  As a new full-fledged member of the Alliance, however, it did show some 
reluctance in further Afghanistan involvement with a refusal to provide more troops.   
 Media in all three countries certainly were able to find points of harmony and 
discord throughout Barack Obama’s first trip abroad.  One obvious point of agreement 
among countries was the positive reception and approach of Barack Obama and his 
diplomatic style.  American media may have dismissed some of this as mere public 
relations, but it seemed to go a long way with Europeans.  Some even saw the approach 
and style of diplomacy as a manifestation of a more multilateral approach, which 
contrasts sharply with the more go-it-alone unilateral strategy of the previous American 
administration. In his approach to reach agreements, Obama was clearly showing a desire 
for multilateralism over the unilateralism that Robert Kagan saw as the traditional 
American approach according to his theory.  In realizing their “Kantian perpetual peace”, 
Kagan claimed that Europeans prefer negotiation and a more nuanced approach of 
analysis.  Although he himself was the American President, Barack Obama appeared to 
exhibit these so-called “European” qualities.  Neoconservatives may say that President 
Obama was “European”, but he was overwhelmingly elected by a majority of Americans. 
It is not clear if a second Republican administration in the White House would 
have also rejected unilateralism, although the campaign run by the Republican nominee 
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in 2008 did not indicate a strong multilateral desire.  It does seem that a Democratic 
administration does embrace a multilateral policy.  To his credit, Robert Kagan did note 
that Europeans were different across party lines as are Americans when it comes to the 
Venus and Mars model.  When George W. Bush was President of the United States, the 
Labour Party was also in power in the United Kingdom.  The French had a center-right 
Gaullist leader in President Jacques Chirac, and the Germans had a leftist leader in 
Gerhard Schroeder.  It is difficult to say if it was the unique administrations of these 
individuals that showed a trans-Atlantic rift; it is hypothetically possible that a different 
political party within the countries could have exhibited a different policy.  Robert 
Kagan’s theory regarding Venusians and Martians seemed to lack a clear reference point 
that could withstand a litmus test throughout time.   Following Kagan’s logic, however, it 
seems that President Obama may have moved closer to Europe and that Europe could 
have moved closer to the United States since the last major rift.    Ultimately, however, if 
Americans are really from Mars and Europeans are really from Venus, it should not 
matter who is in charge.  Political parties, administrations and philosophies do, in fact, 
alter human events and the course of history. 
As it is often said, Europe and the United States do share norms and values.  The 
various countries want to spread prosperity, democracy, and a dignified way of life 
around the world.  While they have many similarities, it is clear that they are not twins.  
The twenty-first century is thus far much different than the twentieth, but the realities a 
few years into the twenty-first century seem to be much different than those of previous 
years.  Consider, for example, the fact that Robert Kagan agreed with Timothy Garton 
Ash’s assessment that “America has too much power for anyone’s good, including its 
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own” that was written in the September 9, 2002 issue of the New York Times justifying 
American unilateralism and the need of Europe to provide counterbalance.  Many 
changes and developments have occurred since then, including the rise of many 
developing nations.  The current world seems to have much more international actors that 
may necessitate more multilateralism abroad.  Since 2002, the American military and 
economy have been put to the test by two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as a 
financial meltdown.  Many other European nations have also had to deal with these 
conflicts and the financial crisis.  The difficulties may have pushed the two sides of the 
North Atlantic back together because they need both an international effort to combat the 
global financial crisis and terrorism.  Although many differences remain on both sides of 
the Atlantic, it would appear that in the beginning of 2009, Americans were not 
necessarily the Martians and Europeans were not always the Venusians.  
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